Schlagwort-Archive: TPM

By the way,

… if it’s worth the effort, this TPM hack may nicely complement an Evil Jan attack. First the attacker carries out the Evil Jan attack to obtain any user-provided key material, next he takes the machine away and cracks the TPM for the rest of the key material. Usually there are easier ways after the initial step, but if, for whichever reason, they should become infeasible, going for the TPM might be an option.

Leaving the TPM exposed to physical attacks while protecting the RAM of a system from wire access, DMA, and cold boot attacks would be a pretty stupid design error, though. But who knows?

The Evil Jan Attack

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Microsoft’s BitLocker is, for all we know, a proper disk encryption software. It encrypts data at rest against attacks originating outside the running system. If you use BitLocker and your computer is stolen while turned off, there is essentially no way of reading data from the disk without having the proper key(s)—your BitLocker PIN, a key file on a USB stick, or both. If an attacker gets access to the machine while it is running, there may be ways of compromising it through Windows or in other ways, but such attacks are clearly outside the scope of disk encryption.

We know, however, another class of attacks against disk encryption: evil maid attacks. This term describes a general strategy rather than a particular implementation. If you leave your computer unattended, let’s say in a hotel room, an attacker, let’s say an evil maid, might manipulate it such that your data will be compromised as soon as you return and provide it with your encryption keys. There are various ways of doing so, for instance installing a hardware keylogger if your keys are based on passwords, or altering the unencrypted boot code to install a Trojan horse that will leak your keys later. The Evil Jan Attack weiterlesen

How much security do we gain from Trusted Computing?

My colleague Jan is going to present our paper Attacking the BitLocker Boot Process at Trust 2009 (Oxford, 6th – 8th April). The paper is an improved version of the draft we presented at ETISS.

BitLocker is the volume encryption function built into recent versions of MS Windows. It is capable of using a Trusted Platform Module if the PC has one. Our paper describes five attack scenarios that using the TPM does not prevent from succeeding. Some are based on particular features of BitLocker while others rely on the implementation of authenticated booting that is currently used in Trusted Computing.

All five scenarios seem suitable for targeted attacks and require that the attacker can access the target system twice. Executing such attacks is thus roughly as complex as installing a hardware keylogger in the system and returning later to retrieve the sniffed password along with the encrypted data – or just the machine in a condition that permits decrypting the data on disk.

What makes our attacks interesting is the fact that they can be implemented in software. Ideally, Trusted Computing should reliably prevent such attacks from succeeding. However, a TPM does not prevent software from being modified. The TPM only compares measured states with stored reference data. This leaves several holes. For instance one can temporarily modify software and later restore the reference state, or modify boot components before the reference state is determined and stored inside the TPM. While such actions are useless in an opportunisitc attack where the attacker just grabs an unattended machine unprepared, a dedicated attacker might take advantage of them.

Update 2009-12-03: There is a more comprehensive explanation in a later post.